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We examine the effect of immigration on public spending from a theoretical (political 
economic) and an empirical perspective. We distinguish between public spending on private 
goods and on public goods. Our model implies that whether immigration increases or 
decreases public spending primarily depends on native’s preferences for private versus public 
good spending. We empirically test our theoretical hypotheses, the ‘fiscal effect’ and the 
‘anti-social effect’ of immigration using OECD panel data for 1990 – 2001. Estimating a 
system of simultaneous equations for total public spending and the share of spending on 
private goods, we find evidence for a negative effect of low-skilled immigration on public 
spending which is attributable to an anti-social effect. The effect of high-skilled immigration 
on public spending is positive, as suggested by a fiscal effect. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
How does immigration change a country’s spending policy? Conventional theory of tax 
competition argues that immigration constrains countries’ spending policies because workers 
have an incentive to migrate to benefit from inter-regional differentials in taxes and benefits. 
Mobile high-skilled workers will move to countries where taxes are lower, other things being 
equal. In the same way, mobile low-skilled workers will move to countries where transfers are 
higher. As a result, the initial extent of public spending becomes unsustainable. Cremer and 
Pestieau (2004) provide a survey of the theoretical literature on labor mobility and fiscal 
redistribution, which yields consistent results: under labor mobility, spending is generally 
lower than in autarky. 
 
Other economic studies, apart from those on arbitrage and tax competition, also argue that 
public spending is lower with migration. Various strands of the political economy literature 
have shown that immigration might induce natives to choose to redistribute less. First, 
immigration may decrease spending, if it increases the dependency ratio in the destination 
country (e.g. when immigrants are primarily low-skilled and thus more likely to become more 
unemployed). Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002), for example, use a median-voter model to 
show that low-skilled immigration may lead to a decrease in the ratio of mean to median pre-
tax income and, consequently, to a lower amount of public spending. They also find empirical 
evidence for this effect that they call ‘fiscal leakage effect’.
1 It refers to the effect of 
immigration on spending via its effect on median voter utility derived from the public budget, 
and we will refer to such an effect as the ‘fiscal effect’ below. 
 
The literature mentioned above does not consider spending on public goods, but models 
public spending as private transfers only. We model public spending on private (rival) goods 
and on public (non-rival) goods. In general, we expect a negative fiscal effect to arise only 
with spending on private goods, since natives do not experience a monetary disadvantage 
when immigrants use non-rival goods, the marginal cost of which is zero. Our results show 
that whether public spending increases or decreases with immigration crucially depends upon 
native preferences for private versus public goods. If natives value public goods more than 
 
1 Using survey data, Luttmer (2001) finds empirical evidence for a ‘negative exposure effect’, where the 
taxpayers’ support for welfare decreases when the number of welfare recipients increases.   2
                                                
private goods, spending increases. If they value private goods more than public goods, 
spending is likely to decrease. 
 
A different branch of the political economy literature suggests that immigration may decrease 
public spending, if immigration increases the heterogeneity of the population. Many authors 
have documented a negative empirical relationship between the degree of racial composition 
of states and their levels of public spending.
2 Alesina and Spolaore (1995), for example, 
develop a model where ethnic heterogeneity decreases the utility natives derive from spending 
on public goods. As a consequence, they opt for lower levels of spending on the public good. 
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) show that the more ethnically heterogeneous a US city 
was in 1990, the less was spent, for example, on public schooling or on roads.  
 
In an extension to our model, immigration decreases the utility natives derive from spending 
on public goods relative to spending on private goods. In line with above literature, we 
assume that the median voter values public goods less in societies with large shares of 
immigrants, who are typically ethnically different from natives – that ‘diversity makes people 
anti-social’.
3 If natives perceive immigrants to be different from them, they might derive 
lower utility from spending on public goods, since public goods are shared with immigrants – 
even if they do not encounter any monetary or otherwise observable disadvantage. 
Introducing such an ‘anti-social effect’ in our model, we find that results from the ‘fiscal 
effect’ might be reversed. That is, if natives value public goods more than private goods, 
public spending may now decrease. If they value private goods more than public goods, 
public spending can increase. 
 
In the first part of this paper, we present the theoretical framework from which we derive 
testable hypotheses on the fiscal effect and the anti-social effect of immigration on public 
spending. We test these hypotheses using data on immigration and fiscal policies in 18 OECD 
 
2 Compare, for example Orr (1976), Alesina and Spolaore (1995), Ribar and Wilhelm (1996), Poterba (1997) and 
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999). 
3 See, for example, the article ‚The kindness of strangers?’ (The Economist, February 28, 2004), which cites a 
large ongoing survey of American communities that ‘seems to show…that levels of trust and co-operation are 
highest in the most homogenous neighbourhoods. People living in diverse areas…are not just more suspicious of 
people who don’t look like them; they are also more suspicious of their own kind.’ countries for the years 1990 – 2001. We explicitly distinguish immigrants by skill, because 
spending is more likely to increase, the higher the skills of immigrants.  
 
In our empirical results, we find that natives value public goods more than private goods, and 
that low-skilled immigration decreases the amount of public spending. We therefore find 
evidence for an anti-social effect of low-skilled immigration. For high-skilled immigration, 
we find that spending increases. Thus, our data suggest that high-skilled immigration is 
associated with a positive fiscal effect. We cannot rule out the existence of an anti-social 







Consider a population which consists of both natives and immigrants, whose numbers are 
exogenously given. There are   natives and   immigrants, both are either high-skilled or 
low-skilled. The number of the high-skilled and low-skilled is   and , respectively. 
They earn some exogenous pre-tax incomes   and . High-skilled workers are more 
productive than low-skilled workers and, therefore,  , for natives and immigrants alike. 
Natives choose the optimal size of public spending g by majority voting. Immigrants are not 
allowed to vote. The amount of public spending is limited by public revenue, which is levied 
by a flat-rate tax on labor income.
n m
, hh nm , ll nm
h y l y
h yy >
4 A share σ of public spending   is spent on private goods 
(mainly cash transfers, e.g. child benefits), and a share 1-σ is spent on public goods (e.g. 
roads). Natives also choose the share of public spending that goes to private goods and to 
public goods by majority voting. Natives and immigrants are treated alike fiscally. 
g
 
2.1 The fiscal effect 
 
The utility function of a native individual i is given by 
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4 That is, the budget constraint needs to hold. where τ  is the flat-rate tax and α  is a preference parameter for private relative to public good 
spending.
5 Utility is the sum of net income and the individual’s share in total public spending. 
Because of non-rivalry, the size of the population does not diminish the utility derived from 
public goods. This is not true for private goods.  
 
The budget constraint implies that total spending equals total revenue: 
  .  (1.2)  () () hh h ll l gm n y m n y τ =+ + + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
 
Using (1.1) and (1.2), we can rewrite individual utility as follows: 
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 is the share of individual income in total income, equivalent to the 
individual share in the cost of public spending .  g
 
Natives choose the optimal size of total public spending   and the optimal share of public 
spending on private goods, 
g
σ  by majority voting. Both parameters depend on the number of 
high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants. 
 
Individual i's preferred size of public spending   is given by the maximization of the utility 
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Individual  i's preferred share of public spending on private goods 
*
i σ  is given by the 
maximization of the utility function (1.3) with respect toσ . The first-order condition is 
 
                                                 
5   is a parameter that enhances marginal utility derived from net income relative to that derived from public 
spending. By setting  , we can avoid that in numerical simulations, we obtain unrealistically high 
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Natives vote simultaneously on the amount and composition of public spending   and  g σ  by 
majority voting. Since voting preferences are single-peaked (the utility function is concave in 
 and g σ ), the voting result will be the choice of the median voter: .
** , med med g σ
6 Our two first-
order conditions (1.4) and (1.5) above give us two relations for the resulting amount and 
composition of public spending: 
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The public spending equilibrium   is characterized by the compatibility of both 
conditions   and . In the following, we will suppress the subscript and write 
** (, med med g σ
G S
* σ  and   for 
the optimal choice of the native median voter for simplicity. 
* g
 
Proposition 1. There exists at least one public spending equilibrium   characterized 
by G  and  . The equilibrium features positive spending on private and public goods. 
** (,) g σ
S
                                                 
6 We assume that the median voter is of the same skill (high-skilled or low-skilled) in both votes, in order to 
avoid transitivity problems of multi-dimensional voting. 
  5 
Proof.  
For a public spending equilibrium, G  and   must cross in  S (,) g σ -space. If both   and   
are downward-sloping or upward-sloping in (,
G S
) g σ -space, they cross at least once, if   is 
higher (lower) for 
g
0 σ =  according to   than according toG , while it is lower (higher) 
for
S
1 σ = .  
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which is the same as (1.10). Therefore, if G  is downward-sloping (upward-sloping) in 
(,) g σ -space,   is downward-sloping (upward-sloping), as well. Moreover, comparing (1.6) 









α > , they are upward-sloping. 
  6 
Further, according to ,  G g  is a positive finite number for  0 σ =  and 1 σ = , while according 
to ,   is infinite (zero) for  S g 0 σ =  and zero (infinite) for  1 σ =  in the case where 
1
2




α > ). Q. E. D. 
 





Proposition 2. Both high-skilled and low-skilled immigration increase public spending, if 
0.5 α <  and condition (1.14) below are fulfilled. 
 
Proof.  
We determine the sign of the effect of immigration from the implicit derivatives of  g  in (1.7) 
and σ  in (1.8) with respect to   and  , for  h m l m 0.5 α < . 
 
First, we use (1.7) in order to derive the effects of high-skilled and low-skilled immigration 
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  7Immigration effects median voter utility derived from public spending  g  in two ways. First, it 





, proportional to the (marginal) 






. Second, immigration decreases 









lowering the amount available for the median voter. Condition (1.13) [(1.14)] states that the 
increase in marginal utility caused by the decrease in the marginal cost of   due to high-
skilled (low-skilled) immigrants is larger than the decrease in marginal utility caused by the 
co-using of public funds. Under this condition, immigration increases the optimal size of   
for the median voter - for any given 
g
g
σ  . See Figure 1. We will refer to numerical simulations 
that examine whether or not conditions (1.13) and (1.14) hold below. 
 
Figure 1. Effect of immigration on public spending,  , for any given share of spending on private goods,  g










Second, we use (1.8) to derive the effect of high-skilled and low-skilled immigration on the 






, if and only if: 
  0 α > .  (1.15) 
This is true by assumption. 
 





, if and only if: 
  0 α > .  (1.16) 
 
Both high- and low-skilled immigrants decrease the optimal share of spending on private 
goods, because the marginal net gain from immigration is lower for spending on private 
goods than for spending on public goods. Immigrants increase the number of taxpayers, but 
they also diminish the utility of natives derived from spending on private goods, while they do 
not diminish utility derived from spending on public goods. 
 
We know that high-skilled (low-skilled) immigration increases public spending  g , if  0.5 α <  
and (1.13) [(1.14)] is fulfilled. If both   and G  are downward-sloping in  S (,) g σ -space, a 
downward shift in  , together with a rightward shift in  , leads to an increase in  . See 
Figure 2. The median voter gains by increasing   with immigration for any given share of 
private good spending 
S G g
g
σ . In addition, she gains by reducing the share of spending on private 
goods, with additional immigrants co-financing public goods. Since natives value public 
goods more than private goods ( 0.5 α < ), the optimal response to immigration for natives is 
to increase public spending  g . Note that, if (1.14) is fulfilled, (1.13) is, too, since  .   lh yy <
Q. E. D. 
 
Figure 2. Effect of immigration on the equilibrium share of spending on private goods, σ , and amount of 
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Proposition 3. Both high-skilled and low-skilled immigration decreases public spending, if 




High-skilled (low-skilled) immigration decreases public spending  , if  g 0.5 α >  and (1.13) 
[(1.14)] is not fulfilled. If both   and G  are upward-sloping in (, S ) g σ -space, a downward 
shift in  , together with a leftward shift in G , leads to a decrease in  S g  . See Figure 3. The 
median voter gains by decreasing  g  with immigration for any given share of private good 
spending σ . In addition, she gains by reducing the share of spending on private goods, with 
additional immigrants co-financing public goods. Since natives value private goods more than 
public goods ( 0.5 α > ), the optimal response to immigration for natives is to decrease public 
spending  . Note that, if (1.13) is not fulfilled, (1.14) is not, either, since  .   g lh yy <
Q. E. D. 
 
Figure 3. Effect of immigration on the equilibrium share of spending on private goods, σ , and amount of 














  102.2 The anti-social effect 
 
So far, we have assumed that immigration effects the native median voter’s preferred size of 
public spending via the fiscal effect alone. However, immigration may also have an effect by 
changing natives’ spending ‘tastes’. In the following, we model an ‘anti-social’ effect of 
immigration, which diminishes natives’ utility derived from public goods – relative to their 
utility derived from private goods. 
 
We introduce the anti-social effect in the form of a positive effect of high-skilled and low-
skilled immigration on the parameter α  in our utility function (1.3): 
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Let us assume that 






.  (1.17) 
Note that in (1.17), we assume that the anti-social effect is the same for low-skilled and for 
high-skilled immigrants. Alternatively, we could assume that it is relatively stronger for the 
low-skilled or the high-skilled and we address this issue below. 
 
Proposition 4. In the presence of an anti-social effect as described in (1.17), (i) high-skilled 
and low-skilled immigration can decrease public spending, if  0.5 α <  and condition (1.14) is 
fulfilled and (ii) high-skilled and low-skilled immigration can increase public spending, if 
0.5 α >  and condition (1.13) is not fulfilled. 
 
Proof. 
We use (1.17) to substitute for α  in (1.4) and, as before, derive the effects of high-skilled and 
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(1.18) and (1.19) do not indicate the sign for the effect of immigration on the optimal amount 
of public spending  . In the presence of an anti-social effect, immigration decreases the 
marginal utility of public spending more than under a pure fiscal effect, since natives value 
private (rival) goods now more strongly. As a consequence, the marginal disutility from 
immigrants receiving private goods increases. Immigration is therefore more likely to 
decrease   for any given 
g
g σ  than before (compare (1.13) and (1.14)).  
 
Now, we use (1.17) to substitute for α  in (1.5) to derive the effects of high-skilled and low-




























− < ,  (1.21) 
which is the same as (1.24). 
 
Again, (1.20) and (1.21) do not provide the sign for the effect of immigration on the optimal 
share of public spending on private goods  σ . In the presence of an anti-social effect, 
immigration reduces the marginal utility of spending on public goods relative to that of 
spending on private goods. Immigration is therefore more likely to increase the share of 
spending on private goods σ  for any given   than before (compare (1.15) and (1.16)).   g
  12 
Whether the total effect of immigration on public spending is positive or negative depends on 
parameter values and is ultimately an empirical issue. All that we say here is that, in the 
presence of an anti-social effect, our results from Proposition 2 and, analogously, the results 
from Proposition 3 can potentially be reversed. Q. E. D. 
 
Of course, we could assume that the anti-social effect is relatively stronger for either low-
skilled or for high-skilled immigrants. Maybe, natives do not mind sharing public goods with 
high-skilled immigrants as much as sharing them with low-skilled immigrants, or vice versa. 
In view of the fact that normally, at least in the developed world, high-skilled immigrants 
share certain characteristics of natives more than low-skilled immigrants do, the former case 
is more probable. For example, high-skilled immigrants in OECD countries usually come 
from other, often neighboring, OECD countries and thus resemble natives more closely in 




Allowing for a different effect of immigration by skill on our preference parameter α  gets us 




















<< .  (1.22) 
Now, an anti-social effect of immigration on public spending will be larger for the low-skilled 
(high-skilled), if γ β >  (β γ > ). For example, given that γ β > , if the anti-social effect of 
high-skilled immigration on public spending is negative, it will be even more negative for the 
low-skilled. Any positive fiscal effect of immigration on public spending will more probably 
be reversed by a negative anti-social effect in the case of low-skilled immigration than in the 





We model two arguments of how immigration may influence the optimal size of public 
spending. The first argument states that immigration changes public spending via a fiscal 
effect. According to this effect, immigration increases spending, if natives value public goods 
                                                 
7 See for example Docquier and Marfouk (2005) on the skills of immigrants by source country. 
  13more than private goods ( 0.5 α < ) and condition (1.14) is fulfilled (Proposition 2).  It 
decreases spending, if natives value public goods less than private goods ( 0.5 α > ) and 
condition (1.13) is not fulfilled (Proposition 3).  
 
The second argument states that immigration can also change public spending via an anti-
social effect. If this effect is present, the predictions above can be reversed, that is, 
immigration may decrease spending under the conditions of Proposition 2 and it may increase 
spending under the conditions of Proposition 3 (Proposition 4). 
 
We can test for the first condition on the size of α  relatively easily: from (1.6) in connection 
with (1.10) and (1.12), we know that   and   are downward-sloping in ( G S ,g σ )-space, if 
0.5 α < .  They are upward-sloping, if  0.5 α > . Including the share of spending on private 
goods in total spending σ , in an empirical estimation of public spending  g , and determining 
the sign of the coefficient tells us, whether  0.5 α <  (the coefficient is negative) or  0.5 α >  
(the coefficient is positive). 
 
Next, we have a closer look at conditions (1.13) and (1.14). When re-formulating (1.13) and 
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Numerical simulations show that if  0.5 α < , (1.24) [(1.14)] will typically be fulfilled, and we 
can conclude that the fiscal effect of immigration (both high- and low-skilled) is positive. For 
small values of α , the marginal loss in utility from sharing spending on private goods with 
immigrants is low relative to the marginal utility gain from immigrants’ co-financing. As a 
consequence, utility can be gained by increasing  . If  g α  exceeds a certain threshold value, 
  14however, the reverse is true. (1.23) [(1.13)] will be invalidated, and we can conclude that the 
fiscal effect of immigration (both high- and low-skilled) on public spending is negative.
8  
 
We can test between the fiscal effect and the anti-social effect of immigration by estimating 
the size of public spending and using (low- and high-skilled) immigration as estimators. If the 
relation between  g  and σ  is negative ( 0.5 α < ), we expect the coefficient on immigration to 
be positive in the absence of an anti-social effect. A negative coefficient on immigration 
would suggest the presence of an anti-social effect. Analogously, if the relation between  g  
and σ  is positive ( 0.5 α > ), we expect the coefficient on immigration to be negative in the 
absence of an anti-social effect. A positive coefficient on immigration would suggest the 
presence of an anti-social effect. 
 
In the following, we estimate a system of structural equations of the total amount of public 
spending and the share of public spending on private goods. We estimate the two equations 
using seemingly unrelated regressions (SURE) (Zellner, 1962), where the error-terms are 
possibly correlated.
9 We distinguish between low- and high-skilled immigration because our 
model allows the possibility of a different effect according to skill. Theoretically, (1.13) can 
be fulfilled, while (1.14) is not. High-skilled immigrants could therefore increase public 
spending, while low-skilled immigrants decrease public spending. Numerical simulations, 
however, practically rule out that possibility. More importantly, in the presence of an anti-
social effect, any additional negative or positive effect on public spending could be relatively 
larger for high-skilled or for low-skilled immigrants (see (1.22)) and produce different signs 




                                                 
8 This threshold value of α might be larger than 0.5, depending on parameter values. (1.13) might therefore still 
be fulfilled for  0.5 α > , and our conclusion on the sign of the fiscal effect of immigration will be less clear. 
9 Alternatively, one could consider estimating the two equations by three-stage least squares (3SLS) (Zellner and 
Theil, 1962), where the dependent variable in one equation appears as an explanatory variable in the other 
equation. Estimation by 3SLS requires for each equation at least one variable not included in the other equations 
(an instrument) for identification. We argue that the estimation by SURE is preferred to estimation by 3SLS as 
the median voter will use all information available to her in either decision and the choice of instrument is 
therefore not clear. 
  153. Data 
 
We use panel data for 18 OECD countries during 1990 – 2001.
10 The data were compiled 




The dependent variables in our system of equations are the total amount of public spending, g, 
(general government total outlays in per cent of GDP) and the share of public spending on 
private goods,σ . Our preferred indicator of the share of public spending on private goods in 
total spending is the share of total transfers received by households in per cent of total 
outlays. The scatter plot in Figure 4 below shows a negative correlation between public 
spending and the spending on transfers. This negative association is confirmed by a fixed-
effects panel regression which is tabulated in Table 1, where we also control for immigration. 
According to our model, the median voter decides the optimal values of g and σ 
simultaneously. We estimate these decisions below, for the moment it is the negative 
association between g and σ  which we want to stress. (Of course, the exact value of α ought 
to be determined by micro-econometric analysis, and possibly by experiments.) 
 
The definition of immigrants for our empirical analysis is the foreign-born of working age, or, 
where data on the foreign-born were not available, foreigners.
12 We collected data on 
immigrants by skill, where we use two categories of skill (low and high) derived from the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 1997.
13 We define as the low-
                                                 
10 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA. 
11 Amongst others, the OECD Labour Force Statistics, the OECD International Migration Statistics, and the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
12 We are more interested in the foreign-born as they comprise all the people who might be ethnically different 
from natives. This means that we may include (naturalized) immigrants who are allowed to vote in our empirical 
work, and we have to assume, according to our model, that they do not change the income of the median voter. 
Even if they did, however, that would most probably not change the (in)validity of conditions (1.23) and (1.24), 
and all our Propositions would still hold. 
13 The ISCED was designed and approved by UNESCO as an instrument suitable for presenting statistics of 
education both within and between countries. (UNESCO, 1997). Razin et al. (2002) also introduce the share of 
medium- and high-skilled immigrants in total population as an additional variable in their policy equations. 
However, they use skill-specific data of only one year (1995) as representative for their whole period. 
  16skilled immigrants those whose highest educational level is secondary education or less 
(ISCED level 4 or less). The high-skilled have attained the first or second stage of tertiary 
education (ISCED level 5 or 6). Low- and high-skilled immigrants are expressed in percent of 
the total population. High-skilled and low-skilled immigrants are expressed as shares in the 
total population. 
 
Control variables in the SURE regressions are GDP per capita (in constant 1995 US dollars), 
the age dependency rate (dependents to working age population), the unemployment rate 
(standardized, OECD definition), and trade openness (sum of exports and imports in percent 
of GDP). We also use an indicator to describe the skewness of the income distribution, the 
share of total income the top quintile of the population receives. The summary statistics of our 
estimating sample are detailed in Table 2.  
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4. Results 
 
The results of our estimates of total public spending g and the share of public spending on 
private goods σ are presented in Table 3. The estimations are made by seemingly unrelated 
regressions which allow for a simultaneous estimation of the two equations. In addition, the 
error-terms of the two equations are possibly correlated. Our preferred model is Model 3, 
because we lose many observations when we also include the top quintile’s share of income 
(Model 5).  Note that Model 4 uses a different variable for the spending on private goods than 
the other models (the sample size is thus slightly smaller).  
 
The main result from our estimations is the clear negative association between public 
spending and low-skilled immigration. Low-skilled immigration is estimated to lower the 
total amount of public spending and spending on private goods. High-skilled immigration, in 
contrast, is estimated to increase public spending and spending on private goods. The 
precision of these estimates however depends on the specification of the equations.  
 
We interpret these results as evidence for an anti-social effect of low-skilled immigration. The 
negative correlation between public spending and the spending share on private goods 
documented in Table 1 and Figure 4 suggests that the median voter prefers public over private 
goods. In this case, our theoretical model predicts a positive fiscal effect of immigration. The 
fact that low-skilled immigration is estimated to decrease public spending can be explained by 
anti-social preferences. High-skilled immigration is estimated to increase public spending, 
which is predicted by the fiscal effect.  
 
While this does not rule out anti-social preferences, the findings show that the effect from 
anti-social preferences does not dominate the positive fiscal effect. Yet, in the absence of an 
anti-social effect, we expect the share of spending on private goods to decrease with 
immigration (compare (1.15) and (1.16)), which it does not for the high-skilled immigrants. 
Because of the positive association between high-skilled immigration and the spending share 
on private goods, we conclude that there is evidence for an anti-social effect for the high-
skilled immigrants, too. This anti-social effect is strong enough to reverse the expected 
positive fiscal effect on public spending in case of low-skilled immigration, but not in the case 
of high-skilled immigration.  
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The other estimation results show that richer countries spend less on public spending than  
 
poorer countries. In addition, high unemployment increases total public spending, the 
association between unemployment and the share of spending on private goods is not 
precisely estimated, but the results suggest that the spending share on private goods is lower 
when unemployment is high. Openness of trade decreases both public spending and spending 
on private goods. There is thus no evidence for an insurance function of the welfare state 
against external shocks as proposed by Rodrik (1998). We also estimate that total public 
spending is lower when the age dependency ratio is higher and find no association between 
the age dependency ratio and public spending on private transfers. All of these findings are 
similar to those of Razin et al. (2002), who use a smaller data set to estimate the effect of 
immigration on transfers per capita. Regarding the negative coefficient on the dependency 
ratio, they argue that population aging represents a net cost to the median voter who gains by 
reducing the amount of public spending in response.
14  
 
In an alternative specification, Model 4, we have used all public spending on social 
expenditure (from the OECD) to gauge the sensitivity of our results to the choice of variable 
for spending on private goods. This alternative choice is less preferred to that above because it 
may include public expenditure on goods which are non-rival. The results however change 
little; our main implications from Model 3 are confirmed.  
 
In a further specification, Model 5, we have included the ratio of the top quintile’s income to 
the income received by the three middle quintiles to control for the skewness of the income 
distribution. Our model, in line with standard political economy models of redistribution, 
predicts that public spending increases with income skewness as expressed by the ratio of 
mean over median income (compare (1.7)). We estimate that the larger the top quintile’s 
income share, the more public spending occurs, both in terms of total spending and in the 
share of private goods. The empirical association between the variables is as implied by 
theory. 
 
The estimates may suffer from reverse causality, as immigration might not be independent 
from public spending (compare the welfare-magnet effect in Borjas (1999)). Allowing for 
such a welfare magnet effect would amount to estimating a system of equations, where 
 
14 Compare Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2000) for a theoretical model on that effect.   20
immigration is not only an exogenous variable (as it is in these equations), but also a 
dependent, endogenous variable. This empirical implementation, however, is difficult at best, 
because of data limitations and because of a lack of instruments. Razin et al. (2002) mention 
the difference in GDP growth between the emigration and the immigration countries as a 
potential instrument for benefits. Even if these data were available to us, which are not, the 




In this paper, we examine the effect of immigration on public spending. We model the size of 
total public spending as a function of the share of spending on private goods and also of high-
skilled and low-skilled immigration. Our model predicts that, in the absence of anti-
immigration sentiments, if the median voter prefers public goods over private goods, low-
skilled and high-skilled immigration unambiguously increases the size of total public 
spending.  High-skilled and low-skilled immigration will lower total public spending, if the 
median voter strongly prefers private over public goods.  
 
We extend our model to allow for anti-immigration sentiments, where immigration causes the 
native median voter to value public goods less than without immigration. Such disutility from 
immigration may offset any positive or negative fiscal effect and, in effect, lower (raise) the 
size of total public spending, if preferences are pro (anti) public goods.  
 
Estimating a fixed-effects panel regression, we find that the empirical association between 
total public spending and the share of private good spending is negative (preferences are pro 
public goods).  
 
We also estimate the empirical effect of low-skilled and high-skilled immigration on total 
public spending and public spending on private goods by using seemingly unrelated 
regressions. We consistently find that low-skilled immigration is associated with less total 
public spending, while high-skilled immigration is associated with greater public spending. 
While there is evidence for an anti-social effect with regard to both low- and high-skilled 
immigrants, we find that it is large enough to dominate the expected positive fiscal effect on 
public spending only in case of the low-skilled, but not in case of the high-skilled. 
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Immigration policies that are designed to select high-skilled immigrants, as they are in place 
in e.g. the U.S, and currently much discussed in Europe, should therefore be more likely to 
prevent a run down of welfare state provisions. We believe it intuitively appealing that in 
societies which prefer spending on public goods to spending on private goods, immigration 
should enhance total public spending, while the opposite should be true in societies which 
prefer public spending on private goods.  
 
Of course, immigration itself might change relative preferences for public and private goods. 
This is also consistent with the observation that the U.S., which are relatively ethnically 
diverse, seem to choose to distribute fewer resources in public goods and fewer resources in 
total than the more homogeneous European societies. A reversal of redistribution policies in 
Europe could be brought about, if ongoing immigration is accompanied by anti-social 
preferences of the kind described. There might be a point at which immigration reduces 
spending preferences for public goods in European societies sufficiently for the fiscal effect of 
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Tables 
Table 1: Fixed-effects panel regression of total public spending. 
 Coefficient[t-stat] 
Share of spending on private 
goods  -0.198 [2.23] 
Low-skilled immigration  0.014  [0.06] 
High-skilled immigration  -0.960  [1.33] 
Constant 56.956  [14.86] 
Note: N=223.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of estimating sample, N=223. 
 Mean  S.D. 
Total public spending  
(% of GDP), g  47.51  8.82 
Public spending on private goods  
(% total public spending), σ  39.79 9.02 
Low-skilled Immigrants  
(% of total population)  3.56  3.81 
High-skilled Immigrants  
(% of total population)  1.67 2.38 
GDP/capita (in 1,000 constant 1995 US dollars)  27.677  8.39 
Age dependency rate   50.05  3.62 
Unemployment rate (OECD definition)  7.22  3.12 
Openness (% of GDP)  68.78  34.51 
Top quintile income share (relative to the income 
share received by the three middle quintiles)
* 0.77 0.12 
Note: * Sample size is 153 observations.  Table 3: Estimation results for public spending and the share of spending on private goods (seemingly unrelated regressions).  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 
Public Spending Share of 
spending on 
Private Goods
Public Spending Share of 
spending on 
Private Goods
Public Spending Share of 
spending on 
Private Goods
Public Spending Share of  
spending on 
Private Goods
























Low-skilled immigrants  -0.284 -0.458 -0.381 -0.529 -0.427 -0.537 -0.436 -0.362 -0.145    -0.305
  [2.300] [3.623] [3.072] [4.114] [3.519] [4.155] [3.497] [3.703] [0.831]   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
    
       
        
        
        
   
   
[1.350]
High-skilled immigrants  0.669 0.721 0.990 0.956 1.078 0.971 1.092 0.474 1.445 0.096
  [1.622] [1.704] [2.389] [2.222] [2.668] [2.256] [2.676] [1.482] [3.293] [0.169]
GDP per capita  -0.549 -0.886 -0.381 -0.763 -0.526 -0.788 -0.458 -0.737 -0.266 -0.941
  [3.487] [5.487] [2.351] [4.539] [3.225] [4.542] [2.682] [5.512] [1.206] [3.294]
Unemployment rate  0.579 -0.172 0.601 -0.156 0.749 -0.130 0.779 -0.188 0.970 -0.158
  [5.372] [1.559] [5.702] [1.425] [6.759] [1.102] [6.653] [2.045] [8.116] [1.020]
Openness  -0.070 -0.051 -0.110 -0.058 -0.120 -0.114 -0.203  -0.062
  [3.293] [2.322] [4.676] [2.311] [4.609] [5.594] [6.291]  [1.491]
Age dependency ratio  -0.510 -0.089 -0.546 -0.175 -0.859  0.077
  [3.532] [0.578] [3.456] [1.416] [4.442]  [0.308]
Income share top 20%  3.165 4.697
  [0.971] [1.114]
Constant  48.748 52.969 45.154 50.341 75.673 55.657 75.850 69.684 82.919 46.744
  [10.654] [11.291] [9.817] [10.549] [7.777] [5.369] [7.305] [8.562] [6.148] [2.679]
N  223.000 223.000 223.000 210.000 153.000   
Note: All models control for country and year fixed-effects. Model 3 uses a different definition of spending on private goods (public social expenditure, as per 
cent of GDP) than the other models (spending on cash transfers, in per cent of total public spending). Sample sizes differ because of missing observations.Appendix: Variable description and source. 
Variable Description  Source 
Fiscal policy     
    
Total public 
spending 
General government total outlays 
(in percent of nominal GDP). 
OECD (2004) Economic Outlook 76. 
    
Public 
spending on  
private goods 
Total transfers received by households  
(in percent of general government total 
outlays). 
OECD (2004) Economic Outlook 76. 
  Public social expenditure (in percent of 
general   government total outlays). 
  OECD (2004) Social Expenditure Database.
    
Immigration    
    
Low-skilled 
immigrants 
Number of foreign-born or foreign of working 
age with primary and secondary education  
(in percent of total population). 
Eurostat (2004), Labour Force Survey. 
OECD (2004), Labour Force Statistics.  
OECD (1997), International Migration 
Statistics.  
Docquier and Marfouk (2005).  
Dumont and Lemaitre (2004).  
Various national statistical databases. 
    
High-skilled 
immigrants 
Number of foreign-born or foreign of working 
age with tertiary education  
(in percent of total population). 
See above. 
    
Controls    
    
Per capita GDP  In constant 1995 US dollars.  Heston and Summers (2002) PWT 6.1. 




Dependents to working age population.  World Bank (2004), World Development 
Indicators. 
    
Unemployment 
rate 
Standardised unemployment rate.  OECD (2004) Economic Outlook 75. 
OECD (2004) Labour Force Statistics. 
OECD (2005) Main Economic Indicators. 
    
Openness   Sum of merchandise exports and imports  
(in percent of GDP). 
World Bank (2004), World Development 
Indicators. 
    
Top quintile 
income share 
The ratio of total income received by the 20 
% of the population with the highest income 
(top quintile) to that received by the three 
middle quintiles. 
Deininger and Squire (1996), updated 
version. 
UNU/WIDER (2004) World Income 
Inequality Database, Version 2.0 beta.  
World Bank (2004), World Development 
Indicators. 
 
 